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More than four years have passed
since the European Directive
1999/93/EC on a Community
Framework for electronic signatures
(the “Directive”) was enacted. While
many have hoped the Directive
would boost the European market
for both public key infrastructure
(PKI) services and applications,
member states have seen highly
different results when implementing
the Directive into national
legislation. While most countries
(even the non-EU ones) have, more
or less faithfully, transposed the
Directive into national laws, a
number of issues have nevertheless
been identified as problematic. The
author provides an analysis of
national legislation implementing
the Directive in terms of the legal
and practical issues involved. A
number of recommendations are put
forward for a possible modification
of the Directive’s scope with respect
to technology, market and legal
developments.1
Scope
The EU Directive has led to the adoption of
national regulatory frameworks for electronic
signatures in almost every European country. The
divergences between these regulatory frameworks
are noteworthy, and the resulting picture very
complex. 
The main aim of the Directive was to create a
Community framework for the use of electronic
signatures, allowing for the free cross-border flow
of products and service provisions, together with a
basic legal recognition of electronic signatures
throughout the EU. This objective has clearly not
completely been reached. This, however, may not
necessarily be the fault of the Directive itself. To
the largest extent, this is due to the low market
uptake of the public key technology itself.
However, the diverse nature of the implementations
of the Directive in the Member States has, in
addition, created uncertainties about the use of
electronic signatures. Some of the Directive’s
provisions seem to have been misunderstood in
part, and the Member States, while transposing
the Directive into national law, have sometimes
failed to focus on the European dimension of the
new regulatory framework. We are therefore
under the impression that there is a primary need
for a consistent, clear and workable re-
interpretation of the Directive’s provisions.
In our view the Commission should begin by
examining the way in which a more “Community-
focused” interpretation of the Directive could be
supported. Of course the ultimate judge on the
correct interpretation of EU law rests with the
European Court of Justice. Nevertheless the
Commission is in a position to issue a non-binding
document that can influence considerably the
electronic signatures debate in Europe. Such an
instrument could be combined with realistic
accompanying measures that can be implemented
in the short term. Such measures can focus on the
improvement of interoperability between solutions,
procedures, schemes and applications, the
streamlining of national solutions for supervision of
certification service providers, co-ordination of
voluntary accreditation schemes, and of conformity
assessment schemes for secure signature-creation
devices, interchange between electronic signature-
related applications and schemes in the public
sector. 
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Findings 
The authors discovered that most of the EU
Member States have, more or less faithfully,
transposed the Directive into national legislation. In
addition, many of the non-EU countries surveyed
have based their own electronic signatures and
delivery of signature related services legislation on
that of the EU Directive. From a technical point of
view the Directive has even influenced
international standardization initiatives, such as the
IETF standardization work on Qualified Certificates.
It is clear that the Directive has influenced legal
and technical activities outside of the European
Union boundaries. Remarkably, the European
Economic Area (EEA) countries, Switzerland, the
Accession and the Candidate countries have
accepted new terminology introduced by the
Directive (especially Qualified Certificate, Advanced
Electronic Signature, and Certification Service
Provider). 
Although the broad lines of the Directive have
been respected by the Member States when
transposing the Directive, a number of issues have
nevertheless been identified as problematic. These
problems can mainly be attributed to a
misinterpretation of the Directive’s wording, which
in turn leads to divergences in national laws and
divergences in the practical application of the
rules. 
Regarding the market access rules as stipulated
by article 3 of the Directive, the following remarks
need to be made. The good news is that for the
moment, none of the Member States surveyed
submit the provision of certification services by
providers established in another Member State to
prior authorization, thus formally respecting article
3.1 on market access. It is, indeed, perfectly
possible for a Certification Service Provider (CSP)
established in one Member State to provide
certification services in another Member State,
without having to ask the prior permission of a
national authority. This was not possible
everywhere in Europe before the Directive was
issued and transposed. 
On the other hand, various Member States have
established supervision schemes that are very close
to prior authorization, and are possibly infringing
article 3.1 provisions. Given that CSPs have been
established in all but a few of the countries
surveyed, and given that the majority of
supervision schemes are still in the very early stages
of development, it is not presently possible to offer
a comparison of the practical implications of the
supervision systems. Nevertheless, it has become
obvious that there are very important divergences
between the various supervision schemes in the
Member States. Although the effect of these
divergences remains limited, since most of the
CSPs still operate exclusively in their home country,
the divergences will begin to show negative effects
once European or non-European providers start to
launch more cross-border certification services
across the EU.
Also, the Directive’s rules on voluntary
accreditation seem to be misunderstood by
national governments. Many European countries
wrongfully consider voluntary accreditation
schemes as a means of controlling whether or not
a CSP operates in compliance with the provisions
of the Directive. Another alarming observation is
that the voluntary accreditation schemes in many
European countries are, in practice, not really
voluntary. A typical example being that many
national e-government programmes only accept
accredited CSPs to participate in the programme,
and thus indirectly oblige a CSP to get an
accreditation. This evolution is certainly not in line
with the Directive’s vision.
Concerning the so-called “public sector
exception” of article 3.7, which allows Member
States to make use of electronic signatures in the
public sector subject to possible additional
requirements, we have seen divergences in both
the interpretation and implementation of this
provision. It seems clear that in many countries the
use of electronic signatures in the public sector is
subject to additional security requirements.
Communicating electronically with public
authorities is in many European countries possible
only through the use of signatures based on
Qualified Certificates issued by an accredited CSP.
Member States need to be reminded that applying
additional conditions can only be justified by
objective reasons and should only relate to the
specific characteristics of the application
concerned. Also, Member States need to ensure
that basic competition rules are not being
infringed by their initiatives.
As to the conformity assessment of secure
signature-creation devices (SSCDs), many countries
seem quite reluctant to designate their own
designated bodies for SSCD assessment. This may
be due to the very high SSCD security
requirements and the lack of active vendors in
most countries. Another reason is the very large
resources needed for operating an assessment
body. The process of assessing a product is usually
extremely expensive as well as time-consuming.
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Two further reasons why vendors are sometimes
reluctant to have their products assessed is that an
assessment is usually only valid for a fairly short
amount of time (the product needs to be re-
assessed), and a conformity assessment “freezes”
a product so that it cannot be changed (e.g., in
order to apply a security patch) without making
the assessment invalid. Consequently, although
there already are a small number of SSCDs that
have been assessed, all of these have been
assessed by a relatively small number of
designated bodies. Only in Austria, Germany and
the Czech Republic have the number of products
assessed been higher than two. In some countries
(Austria, Germany) signature products other than
SSCDs have been assessed as well.
The non-discrimination principle of electronic
signatures, as regulated by article 5.2 of the
Directive, has been taken over by national
legislators. However, the transposition of article 5.2
has not always been explicitly done, and in those
countries with an explicit transposition the scope
of article 5.2 has not always been covered in its
entirety. It is not yet clear whether this rather
vague transposition in some countries will have a
practical effect on the legal use of electronic
signatures. Thus, how electronic signatures will be
treated in future national legislation and case law
requires close monitoring.
It would be too premature to jump to early
conclusions on judges’ position vis-à-vis electronic
signature given that to date there are but a few
legal cases on this subject. Indeed, until recently,
the sample of case law tackling directly or simply
evoking electronic signatures issues is still too small
and fragmented to be considered as representative
enough of the judge’s mind in this area. 
As to the legal effect of Qualified Electronic
Signatures (the ones regulated by article 5.1 of the
Directive), there has been a general tendency in
the majority of European countries to explicitly
recognise the equivalence between a handwritten
signature and a specific “type” of signature by
imposing the same or slightly different conditions
than the ones stipulated in article 5.1. It is,
however, important to know that the Directive
obliges Member States only to make sure that a
Qualified Electronic Signature is, legally speaking,
treated in the same way as a handwitten
signature, but that it does not regulate the legal
use and consequences of a handwritten signature
itself, and thus not the legal consequences of the
Qualified Electronic Signature either. The legal use
and consequences (such as which transactions
need a signature, and what evidential value is
given to a signature) remains a nationally regulated
matter.
Qualified electronic signatures need to be in
compliance with the requirements as stated by the
first three Annexes of the Directive. It is, therefore,
important that the Annexes are correctly
transposed into national legislation. The
implementation of Annex I is very similar in most
of those countries surveyed. The only risk is related
to interoperability problems which might occur if
technical implementations of Annex I diverge by,
for example, not using ETSI TS 101 862, or any
other common format for encoding the
requirements of Annex I. The European
Commission should therefore promote the use of
interoperability standards for the technical
implementations of Annex I. For the
implementation of Annex II, implementation levels
sometimes vary, meaning that the establishment
and running of a CSP will differ considerably. Any
organization wishing to establish a CSP business in
several countries must therefore adapt itself to
different requirements and procedures. Product
vendors will also have difficulties building products
for this very fragmented market. In addition,
several countries put additional detailed and
unnecessary requirements on the CSP, thus
creating barriers for the establishment of a CSP.
The Commission should therefore point out any
unnecessary and excessive requirements for CSPs,
which might be perceived as market obstacles. For
the implementation of Annex III, there is also
evidence of fragmentation. The requirements for
SSCDs are, for example, much higher in Austria
and Poland than in some other European
countries. As far as Annex IV is concerned, article
3.6 is very clear. The list contains only
recommendations, which have to be taken into
account by the Member States and the European
Commission when they work together in order to
promote the development and the use of
signature-verification devices. They cannot be
changed into obligatory requirements at a national
level, as some Member States have done.
With very few exceptions, all European
countries have provided for a special liability
provision, transposing article 6 of the Directive into
national legislation. Within the European Union,
the respective liability clauses of the EU Member
States have followed the wording and rationale of
article 6. In cases where transposition was not
explicit, the general tendency has been to provide
stricter liability clauses, by broadening the scope of
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application of the article, notably, by extending the
list of liability causes as laid down in the Directive.
All countries under examination have prescribed
in their national laws rules on the legal recognition
of foreign Qualified Certificates in their territory.
Only Ireland, the United Kingdom and Malta do
not distinguish between domestic and foreign
Qualified Certificates. Most of the EU and EEA
countries have faithfully transposed the conditions
of article 7 into their national legislation. In the
Accession and Candidate countries, the situation
appears to be somewhat more complicated. 
The implementation of the data protection rules
of article 8 into national legislation apparently do
not pose any real difficulties. Some countries,
though, did not correctly implement article 8.2 of
the Directive. In those countries, a CSP is not
obliged to follow the stricter data protection rules,
whereas a CSP established in another Member
State must adhere to its national rules. This may
give rise to complaints of unfair competition, in
that it could act as an obstacle to trade within the
internal market. Further discussion also needs to
centre on whether the stringent rules of article 8.2
for CPS issued certificates to the public, (such as
obligation to for direct personal data collection),
are realistic, given that most CSP data is obtained
from third parties such as a local registration
authority. The use of a pseudonym in a certificate
is allowed in all but two of the countries surveyed.
Only Estonian and Bulgarian electronic signature
legislation forbids the use of pseudonyms in their
national rules on Qualified Certificates. Many
countries explicitly require the disclosure of real
names to the public authorities upon request and
under strict conditions.
An important question, which needs to be
posed, is to what extent are Qualified Electronic
Signatures used in Europe? The number of
supervised and accredited CSPs issuing Qualified
Certificates in the European countries varies
considerably from country to country, with many
countries having either no or only one CSP. In the
few countries where any larger numbers of
Qualified Certificates have been issued, this is
almost exclusively due to some form or another of
government promotion. There is currently no
natural market demand for Qualified Certificates
and related services. The largest application area in
Europe for Qualified Electronic Signatures is
generally linked to e-banking applications in a
closed user environment, and thus outside the
scope of the Directive. Within the scope of the
Directive, very few applications are in use today
and they are almost completely limited to e-
government. 
It is interesting to note that many application
service providers currently on the market falsely
believe that their applications require Qualified
Electronic Signatures as a minimum in order to be
legally compliant, leading to unnecessary costs and
complexity on planning and designing for the use
of Qualified Electronic Signatures. 
Technology evolves rapidly, and in the near
future many electronic signature technical
solutions will be based on new technological
developments, such as new secure personal
computer environments, mobile signatures and
signature servers. Consequently, supervision
bodies, designated bodies and others involved in
the regulation of Qualified Electronic Signatures
should look at these technologies with an open
mind, and not restrict security assessments to what
is known and available today.
The lack of interoperability, both at national and
cross-border level, is a big obstacle for market
acceptance and the proliferation of electronic
signatures. It has resulted in many isolated
“islands” of electronic signature applications,
where certificates from only one CA can be used
for one application. In a few cases only can
certificates from multiple CAs be used for multiple
applications. Much more should therefore have
been done earlier at a European level to promote
interoperability.
The European Electronic Signature
Standardisation Initiative (EESSI) programme has
developed some standards that comply with the
Directive. However, the delay in developing the
standards and having their references published in
the Official Journal has led to a situation whereby
several countries have either developed their own
technical interpretations of the Directive, (leading
to varying requirements in different countries), or
else have waited for standards to be developed,
leading to a vacuum for product and service
vendors on the market. Not until the publication of
references to standards in the Official Journal in
July 2003 has there been any clarity on the
standards acceptable to all Member States.
Another risk relating to interoperability is that
currently only one set of standards related to
Qualified Electronic Signatures (based on PKI)
currently exists, which may hinder further
technologies being used for Qualified Electronic
Signatures.
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The recommendations 
n Introduction
Our first recommendation is not to amend the
Directive. Such amendments would have to be
considered as an ultimate solution, only to be used
when all other measures are deemed to be
insufficient. Amending the Directive is a long and
cumbersome operation that should be avoided if
at all possible. As with all EU Directives, the
Directive is by no means a perfect legal text. It is a
compromise that has been reached after long and
difficult negotiations between 15 Member States,
all of whom have very divergent views on these
issues. Our main conclusion is that the text of the
Directive is adequate enough to serve its purpose
in the near future but that it needs re-
interpretation and clarification. 
n General recommendation
The primary aim of the Directive was to create a
Community framework for the use of electronic
signatures, allowing for the free cross-border flow
of products and provision of services, together
with a basic legal recognition of electronic
signatures throughout the EU. This objective has
clearly not entirely been met. However, this
negative situation is not necessarily the fault of the
Directive, but rather to the way in which it has
been implemented by the Member States. Some
of the Directive’s provisions seem to have been, in
part, misunderstood and the Member States,
when transposing the Directive into national
legislation, have not always taken the European
perspective of the new regulatory framework into
account. It is therefore our impression that, at this
moment, there is a primary need for a consistent,
clear and workable re-interpretation of the
provisions of the Directive. 
In our view the European Commission needs to
first and foremost examine how a more
“Community-focused” interpretation of the
Directive could be supported. Of course the
ultimate judge on the correct interpretation of
European law provisions rests with the European
Court of Justice. At the same time, however, the
Commission is in a position to issue a non-binding
document, which could considerably influence the
electronic signatures scene in Europe. Such an
instrument could be combined with realistic
accompanying measures capable of being
implemented in the short term.
n Supervision of CSPs 
The European countries surveyed for this report
appear to have difficulties in striking a balance
between the appropriate supervision of CSPs, and
the prohibition to submit their activities to prior
authorization. It would therefore be useful to
publish guidelines on how the supervision can be
organized in order to make it conform to the
Directive’s provisions. The European Commission
can take action against Member States that have
established a scheme for the supervision of CSPs
leading to measures that have the equivalent
effect as a prior authorization. 
The guidelines to be published by the European
Commission can also be used to clarify a number
of currently unresolved legal issues in this area.
One of the most difficult questions is to know
what the notion of “establishment on the
territory” in practice means for a Certification
Service Provider. For example, it is debatable as to
who is in charge of the supervision where a
certificate issuer established in one Member State,
collaborates with registration authorities, directory
service providers, and others in other Member
States.
Not all the Member States have established a
scheme for the appropriate supervision of CSPs
issuing Qualified Certificates to the public. The
Commission can take action against these
Member States, because this situation creates the
possibility for CSPs established in those Member
States to issue Qualified Certificates to the public
in other Member States without being submitted
to appropriate supervision. 
Ideally the supervision schemes in the Member
States should be harmonized, at least to a certain
degree. We think that efforts in this direction
should be supported. The Commission should, in
our view, discourage supervision of CSPs other
than those issuing Qualified Certificates to the
public. 
Since EESSI has already published a number of
valuable documents in this area, it is
recommended that supervisory authorities be
encouraged to make use of these specifications. In
our view, however, the use of such specifications
by supervisory authorities has to be closely
monitored. The standardization documents
describe possible paths to fulfill the requirements
of the Directive, but should never be considered
obligatory for CSPs wishing to issue Qualified
Certificates to the public. If a CSP believes that it
fulfils the requirements of the Annexes, it should
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be free to issue Qualified Certificates to the public
without asking for authorization. 
n Voluntary accreditation
Measures should be taken in order to clarify the
vision of the European legislator with regard to
voluntary accreditation schemes for Certification
Service Providers. In our view, cross-border
accreditation and diversification of the schemes
should be encouraged. The Commission should,
on the other hand, discourage as much as possible
the establishment of national accreditation
schemes for Certification Service Providers issuing
Qualified Certificates to the public. Accreditation
schemes should focus on the assessment of best
practices and appropriate security, and not be
considered as instruments to control the
compliance with the Directive or with national
legal provisions. 
Given the scarcity of top experts in the area of
information security, and given the relatively small
amount of CSPs, the Commission should stimulate
the clustering of efforts on a Community level. The
objective should be to establish a limited number
of high quality European accreditation schemes,
preferably focusing on or specializing in specific
categories of certification services for application
domains.
n Secure signature-creation
devices 
Partly because the Directive currently sets very
high requirements on SSCDs, such devices still
rarely find their way to the market. In order to
stimulate the production of secure signature-
creation devices, the requirements for formal
assessment needs to be more flexible in the future.
The procedures for obtaining a conformity
declaration should be shorter and less costly. The
European Commission should support every effort
in this direction. 
As to the rules to be followed by the designated
conformity assessment bodies, the Commission
should provide coordination and guidance. The
Commission Decision of 2000 on the minimum
criteria when designating conformity assessment
bodies is a valuable first step, but needs to be
pursued.2 The independent, transparent and non-
discriminatory character of the assessment
procedure should ideally be monitored.
In the view of the authors of this report, it is
absolutely necessary to discourage the perception
that it is an obligation to submit every SSCD to a
lengthy Common Criteria influenced assessment
performed by a designated body. Instead, limited
evaluations, based on 50-100 pages of
documentation and requiring 10-20 days of
checking, needs to be promoted. In not allowing
self-assessment, an independent party should be
able to assess the security claims (with respect to
Annex III) as made by the vendor and checked to
some extent whether or not this is state of the art.
The Commission should examine how it can tackle
the obligation to submit an SSCD to a designated
body for conformity assessment, currently existing
in many Member States. By discouraging a too
strict conformity assessment would allow for a
larger variety of products, while at the same time
protecting consumers.
n Public sector exception
The Commission should emphasize the
conditions that are needed before the Member
States can use the public sector exception of article
3.7 of the Directive. Member States should be
made aware that the non-discrimination rule of
article 5.2 of the Directive applies not only to the
private but also to the public sector.
The Commission should examine in more detail
the compliance of certain e-government initiatives,
not only in relation to the Electronic Signatures
Directive’s provisions, but also in relation to general
EU competition rules, particularly with a view on
article 86 of the EC Treaty.
More generally, it is necessary to perform a
more detailed study on the Internal Market
consequences of the e-government programmes
of the Member States. There is a clear danger that
these programmes will result in national barriers,
fragmentation and interoperability. Efforts towards
improvement of interoperability between e-
government programmes, and particularly
between their electronic signature applications
should be supported or initialized at a European
level.
n Qualified Electronic Signatures 
With regard to article 5.1, there is primarily a
need for clarification about the scope of this
provision. It should be made clear to all interested
parties that:
n “Qualified Electronic Signature” is not a 
synonym of “legally valid electronic 
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signature”, and
n fulfilling the requirements of a Qualified 
Electronic Signature is one – but by no means
the only - way to get the rules on 
handwritten signatures applied. 
From a European perspective, the success of
article 5.1 depends entirely on the availability of a
very well standardized and easily recognizable
European Qualified Electronic Signature, including
not only criteria for creation devices and
certificates, but specifying the complete signature
and verification chain. A standardized Qualified
Electronic Signature should merely give users a
presumption that a signature complying with this
standard will be presumed equivalent to
handwritten signatures throughout Europe. 
Member States should be discouraged from
inserting references to Qualified Electronic
Signatures in new legal texts. The concept of the
Qualified Electronic Signature should be used
mainly for its original purpose, namely to obtain
automatic acceptance of electronic signatures, and
that the same provisions governing handwritten
signatures apply to electronic ones.
Member States should be made aware that the
concept of the Qualified Electronic Signature is
mainly useful for cross-border transactions in
Europe. It serves as a “passport” that guarantees
in every Member State the application of the rules
applicable to handwritten signatures. 
The Annexes have been more or less literally
transposed into national legislation by virtually all
the countries surveyed. The remaining task is to
make sure that the implementation gets
streamlined throughout Europe. Every effort in this
direction should be supported. National
implementations of the Annexes have, on the
other hand, to be firmly discouraged. The
Commission can, perhaps should take action
against those Member States who have not
correctly transposed the Annexes by, for example,
translating the recommendations of Annex IV into
requirements for Qualified Electronic Signatures at
a national level. 
n Non-discrimination rule
With regard to the application of article 5.2,
there is a primary need for clarification. All
interested parties should be better informed about
the objective and the scope of this provision. The
Commission should systematically examine if the
Member States have issued legislation referring to
Qualified or Accredited Electronic Signatures, and
detect where such references do not comply with
the rule of article 5.2.
n Standardization
The Commission and Member States must
ensure that all Member States correctly implement
presumption of conformity with standards
referenced in the Official Journal. This is currently
not the case everywhere.
The Commission and Member States should
encourage further work on standards related to
Annex II (f) and Annex III, in order to promote the
use of alternative technologies for Qualified
Electronic Signatures. Although the present
standards are mostly technology neutral (within
the framework of PKI), they still favour the use of
smart cards as SSCDs for example. The long-term
maintenance of the standards referenced in the
Official Journal must be ensured, either by
transferring the current CWAs to a more
permanent body, for example ETSI, or promote the
CWAs to European Norms.
The Commission must urgently ensure the
acceptance of a common specification for
algorithms and parameters, as well as a common
maintenance procedure for that specification.
The complex areas of archiving and long-term
validation of electronically signed documents are
often perceived as obstacles for the use of
electronic signatures. The Commission should
promote work on guidelines and standards in
these areas.
The Commission and the Member States should
find mechanisms to promote or recommend the
standards for interoperability already developed by
ETSI within the framework of EESSI. The
Commission should support the work being done
in EUCLID and CEN Workshop on e-
authentication, steering them towards developing
appropriate European standards, taking into
account the results from EESSI, pki Challenge and
other projects.
The European Commission should promote or
arrange a European forum for electronic
signatures, directed towards CSPs, product vendors
and application providers in order to stimulate
development and use of standards, possibly also
initiating the setting up of interoperability testing
facilities.
It is probably useful to systematically scan the
existing standardization documents from a user’s
perspective. With regard to Qualified Electronic
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Signatures, the aim of the standardization activities
should be to develop the specifications of a
solution that gives the user the possibility to use
electronic signatures on a European-wide scale.
Such a solution has to take into account all the
aspects of an electronic signature, not only
covering the whole signature chain but also taking
care of typical users’ concerns such as ease of use,
language obstacles, and cost considerations,
amongst other issues.
n Trust service providers
The Directive is very strongly focused on one
business model, which was the centre of the
attention from 1998 and 2000, but which has
progressively been replaced by a much more
heterogeneous and complex market situation. The
regulatory framework thus includes, for example,
quite detailed rules for certificates providers, but
does not deal with other categories of certification
providers. The regulatory needs relating to other
categories of trust service providers are
nevertheless at least as urgent as those with
regard to certification service providers. There is,
for example, a clear need for regulation dealing
with archival service providers, or with registered
mail services. From a users’ perspective it is difficult
to understand why such services remain
completely unregulated, while at the same such a
complex regulatory framework has been
established for issuers of certificates. We therefore
recommend undertaking studies about the need
for regulation with regard to other categories of
trust services. 
n Data protection
Last but not least it is necessary to combine
electronic authentication with personal data
protection. The current European regulatory
framework is very much focused on the use of
identity certificates. In recent years, attention has
shifted towards better privacy protection in the on-
line environment. Research has been done on
various possibilities, combining electronic
authentication with the needs for anonymity or
the use of multiple virtual identities. The efforts of
the EU to promote advanced personal data
protection for its citizens should not be
contradicted by its regulatory framework for
electronic authentication. Closer examination is
needed on the possibilities to combine anonymity
and pseudonymity with the provisions of the
Directive.
n Final remarks
Our final reflections in the framework of this
report focus on the user. In our view it is absolutely
necessary to put more emphasis on the user’s
perspective in all discussions regarding the
European electronic signatures regulatory
framework. The absence of this perspective has
been a more or less constant theme not only in
the legal discussion, but also in the standardization
activities around the Directive. Business and
technical considerations prevailed strongly in every
debate in this area. This has resulted in a set of
legal and technical solutions that are often far
removed from the daily needs of the common
user. 
As far as standardization is concerned, it is
probably useful to systematically scan the existing
standardization documents from a user’s
perspective. With regard to Qualified Electronic
Signatures, the aim of the standardization activities
should be to develop the specifications of a
solution that gives the user the possibility to use
electronic signatures on a European-wide scale.
Such a solution has to take into account all aspects
of electronic signatures, not only covering the
whole signature chain but also taking account of
typical users’ concerns such as ease of use,
language obstacles and cost considerations. 
With regard to the legal framework, it may
become necessary to take a more practical
approach. The Directive focuses very strongly on
one business model, which took centre stage from
1998 to 2000 but which has since been replaced
by a much more heterogeneous and complex
market. As a result of this, the current regulatory
framework includes detailed rules for issuers of
certificates but fails to consider other types of
certification providers. Services like time-stamping,
revocation, repository, and archival can be offered
by third parties which are contracted by the
authority issuing certificates. Yet regulatory needs
relating to other categories of trust service
providers are at least as important as those relating
to the certification service providers. There is, for
example, a clear need for regulation dealing with
archival service providers, or with registered mail
services. From a users’ point of view it is difficult to
understand why such services remain completely
unregulated, while complex regulatory frameworks
have been well established for those issuing
certificates. We therefore recommend that further
studies be carried out dealing with other
categories of trust services. 
Finally, it is necessary to combine electronic
The efforts of the
EU to promote
advanced personal
data protection
for its citizens
should not be
contradicted by its
regulatory
framework for
electronic
authentication
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authentication with personal data protection. The
current European regulatory framework is very
much focused on the use of identity certificates. In
recent years, attention has shifted towards better
privacy protection in the on-line environment.
Research has been focused on the possibility of
combining electronic authentication with the
needs for anonymity or the use of multiple virtual
identities. The efforts of the European Union to
promote advanced personal data protection for its
citizens should not be contradicted by its
regulatory framework for electronic authentication.
Further research is needed into the possibility of
combining anonymity and pseudonymity with the
provisions of the electronic signatures Directive. 
The authors are aware of the fact that its
conclusions and recommendations can only be
considered as a first step in the review of the
European regulatory framework for electronic
signatures. We hope that our recommendations
will provide interesting material for launching a
European-wide discussion on this subject.
Although this report does not cover the legal
landscape of the United States, Canada, Japan and
Australia, it is still wise to consider what is
happening in other parts of the world before
formulating European recommendations. The
major market players global strategies vis-à-vis
electronic signatures and internet standardization
will also have to be considered in order to get a
clear forecast for the future situation in Europe in
this field. n
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